August 13, 1940. FROM REICHMARSCHALL GOERING TO ALL UNITS OF AIR FLEETS 2, 3, AND 5. OPERATION EAGLE. WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD YOU WILL WIPE THE BRITISH AIR FORCE FROM THE SKY. HEIL HITLER. With the issuance of this vague, yet unmistakable, order Britain found itself alone and fighting for its very existence against the most powerful military nation on earth: Germany. Although The Battle of Britain, as it would come to be known, is remembered as an air battle between BritainÆs R.A.F. and GermanyÆs Luftwaffe, its real importance lies in the message that it sent to the rest of the world. At the conclusion of The Battle of Britain, the LuftwaffeÆs illusion of military invulnerability would be shattered and the world would finally see a fallible German military machine.
In the Summer of 1940 it was easy to view the German armed forces as an unstoppable juggernaut. The Germans won a quick victory in Poland, and went on to occupy Norway and Denmark in 1940. In May they overran the Low Countries, broke into France, and swept to the English Channel. On June 22 France surrendered (although a Free French force continued to fight). Britain, under Prime Minister Winston Churchill, was left to fight alone. The only question that remained was: Would England continue to fight, or pursue peace with Germany?
Hitler, believing EnglandÆs military position to be hopeless, had not even drawn up a plans for her conquest. Instead, Hitler had sent peace-feelers to London through several neutral sources. The Vatican sent an inquiry by way of its Papal nuncio in Switzerland. From Sweden, the King himself urged a settlement with Germany. In Spain, Nazi emissaries were having direct talks with the British Ambassador, Sir Samuel Hoare. Unofficially, Churchill, in an attempt to gain more time, encouraged both appeaser in Parliament and intermediaries in neutral countries in the belief that his government would not be unwilling to come to an arrangement with the Nazis. However, on July, 2, 1940, when Germany began to suspect that England had no intention of surrendering HitlerÆs chief military aide, Field Marshal Wilhem Keitel, issued instructions to all three services to prepare for an invasion of Britain. The invasion was to be code-named Operation Sea Lion. Two weeks later Hitler issued directive No. 16 for the Conduct of the War. Directive No. 16 began: ôAs England, in spite of the hopelessness of her military position, has so far not shown herself willing to come to any compromise, I have decided to begin to prepare for, and if necessary to carry out, an invasion of England. This operation is dictated by the necessity of elimination Great Britain as a base from which the war against Germany can be fought , and if necessary the island will be occupied.ö
The operation against Britain had been divided into three main phases. First would come the campaign over the Channel to sink all British merchant shipping, to attack Royal Navy ships, bases and installations, and to destroy or drive out of the sky any R.A.F. fighters that sought to prevent these maneuvers. Second would come a massive onslaught to paralyze BritainÆs air arm once and for all by obliterating all R.A.F. fields, defenses and aircraft factories in a gigantic combined bomber and fighter blitz. This operation was code named Eagle Attack. In the third and final phase, the Luftwaffe would cover and help implement Operation Sea Lion. Unbeknownst to the Germans, the English had two secrets that would come to aid them greatly in the coming months. The first of these was a new invention called radar.
The British radar system consisted of two primary types of radar. The first was used for detecting high flying aircraft at long range. Nicknamed ôChain Homeö this system was useful for spotting German aerial formations as they assembled over the French coast. However, this network was incapable of spotting planes that came in low over the channel. A second network, ôChain Home Low,ö was created to detect these low flying craft and to provided complete radar coverage for the entire Southern and Eastern coast of England. (fig. 1) Radar gave the British an enormous advantage; there was no need to keep aircraft on endless patrols on the off chance that something might happen; they were scrambled only for a definite threat and then, while in the air, directed on to the enemy craft by the ground controller on the basis of radar reports depicted in front of him on a plotting table. In deciding how to allocate these dispositions, the British had another invaluable aid besides radar-an aid so secret that only the highest officials of the British government knew about it.
The British had acquired a machine, called Ultra, that enabled them to break the complex German code; thus they could estimate the LuftwaffeÆs intended targets and the numbers of aircraft that were involved even before the planes left the ground. Transcripts of the GermansÆ radio traffic were available to the British whenever German planes went aloft . The two factors of and efficient radar system and the fore-knowledge of German plans gave the British a decided advantage in being able to allocate their outnumbered forces effectively. Many German pilots felt that the British must have been psychic due to the fact that whenever the Germans attempted a surprise raid on England, there was always a squadron of Spitfires and Hurricanes to meet them. Despite this British advantage however, the Germans would not be deterred from their goals and the attacks on England began.
Even though Eagle Day began on August 13, 1940, the actual start of the Battle of Britain was July 10, 1940. On this day the German Luftwaffe began phase one of their operations against Britain. This involved the sinking of all Royal Navy ships and merchant vessels in the English Channel. The Germans flew almost daily raids against British shipping in order to not only knock out BritainÆs naval lifeline, but also to entice the R.A.F. into the skies so that it could be destroyed. Fortunately radar help the British determine the enemy planes were fighters, which posed a threat only to other planes, or the heavier bombers which were the genuine menace to shipping. Consequently the British would only send up squadrons to intercept the bombers, thereby reducing the risk to their own planes. From this period from July 10 to August 12, 1940 the Luftwaffe lost 286 planes, bombers and fighters, compared to BritainÆs 148; Luftwaffe raids on shipping sank only 30,000 tons out of about 5 million tons in British waters in the same time. In July British Air Chief Marshall Sir Hugh Dowding noted in his journal that he had a feeling time was on the side of the R.A.F. and Britain ôif we can only hold on.ö What he did not know was that Luftwaffe intelligence officers were on his side, too. The figures of R.A.F. casualties that they produced for Goering toward the end of the month convinced the Reich Marshal that phase one of the Battle of Britain had already been won-that the channel had been closed and the R.A.F. crippled in the air. The truth was that small coastal convoys still sailed through the Straits of Dover and would continue to do so. As to the R.A.F. it had more front-line fighters at the end of July than at the beginning; in this one month alone, British aircraft worker had produced 496 fighters-four times the number turned out in a typical month before Dunkirk in June of 1940. Goering presented Hitler with his own statistics and asked permission to ready his forces for phase two of the battle. On August 1 Hitler issued war directive No. 17 which decreed ôIn order to establish the conditions necessary for the final conquest of England I intend to continue the air and sear war against the English homeland more intensively than before.ö The orders in directive No. 17 were:
╖ The total elimination of the English air force both in the air and on the ground.
╖ Destruction of all harbors except those that Germany would later use for invasion.
╖ Attacks on naval shipping when the opportunity presented itself.
╖ Terror raids as reprisal I [Hitler] reserve the right to order myself.
Even though the German intelligence that lead the Germans into phase two of their plan was woefully inadequate, it was the second phase that almost destroyed the R.A.F.. If not for a fortuitous German mistake the R.A.F. might well have been lost, and with them the battle.
The three weeks following Eagle Day were to be the most trying for the R.A.F.. The Luftwaffe, now free from raids on shipping, swept up and down the coast of England knocking out radar sites, airfields, aircraft factories, and fuel supply depots. In one day the Luftwaffe flew almost 1500 sorties. Even though losses on both sides were considerable (fig. 2) the Germans could sustain these losses while the English, loosing the airfields and planes they were so desperately short of, could not. In the weeks between August 10 and August 24 the R.A.F. lost 193 fighters compared to 406 fighters and bombers from the Luftwaffe. More importantly the R.A.F. was losing the one commodity that it could not replace: itÆs pilots. Since August 8, R.A.F. Fighter Command had lost 94 pilots killed or missing and another 60 fliers had been hospitalized with wounds or burns. By August 24 Fighter Command was 200 pilots short, and those who were still able to fly were on the verge of exhaustion. On August 31 Fighter Commands combat losses totaled 39 planes and 14 pilots, its heaviest casualties ever for a single day. For the first time since the Battle of Britain had begun, fewer German planes had been destroyed during the course of the day than the R.A.F. had lost. With the relentless pounding of the R.A.F.Æs airfields and factories, Air Marshall Dowding remarked ôWhat we need now is a miracle.ö Unbeknownst to him he had already received that miracle in the form of two lost German pilots.
On the night of August 24, 170 Luftwaffe bombers swept in to raid targets from Kent all the way north to the Scottish border. Two of these planes lost visual contact with their lead pathfinder bombers and strayed on beyond the main attack pattern. As the two planes began to draw more and more flak the pilots realized that they were lost and decided to return to base. They jettisoned their bombs, turned east and raced for home. Unbeknownst to the pilots they were over London when they released their bombs. The bombs landed in the financial district killing several civilians and destroying the church of St. Giles in Cripplegate.
There is little doubt that the bombing was an accident. Hitler specifically prohibited it in Directive No. 17 and Goering, upon learning of the bombing, demanded the names of the captains of each flight so that they could be reassigned to infantry duty. Accidental or not this was exactly the kind of opportunity Churchill and Fighter Command had been waiting for.
On August 25 the Chiefs of Staff Committee unanimously voted for a reprisal strike on Germany. That night the R.A.F. made a raid on the Berlin suburb of Ruhleben. Although the raid did little damage it did alarm the populace and inflame Hitler. Churchill immediately gave instructions that the R.A.F. would continue hitting Berlin until the Germans reacted. After 4 more raids into Berlin Hitler was sufficiently outraged to change the basic strategy of the Battle of Britain. On September 7 1940 Goering, under HitlerÆs orders, sent hundreds of bombers and fighter escorts across the channel with only one target: London. The first raids over London were conducted during the day. This enabled the bombers to accurately identify their targets. Navigation was also easier as the German pilots could check their position against topographical features such as the Thames oxbow. (fig. 3)
Unfortunately for the German bomb crews, daylight bombing also meant that they could be seen much easier, and were therefore easier targets for fighters and ground fire. The attacks of September 7/8 killed about three hundred Londoners and wounded over a thousand others. The Luftwaffe also suffered heavily. The raid cost the Germans fifty-three planes, most of them fighters. Although no one knew it at the time the British had just won the Battle of Britain.
In round-the-clock raids over the next seven days, 2,000 Londoners died and more than 10,000 were wounded. Although these casualty figures were all the more horrific because the wounded were civilians, there were those who rejoiced at the bombings. The GermansÆ concentration on the capital had the immediate effect of taking the pressure off Fighter CommandÆs airfields and supply factories. It also enabled the R.A.F. to hit back at the enemy hard enough to hurt, because now the British knew where the Luftwaffe was focusing is attacks and could be ready and waiting.
On September 15 Goering decided to mount an all-out aerial attack on London. Goering organized over 400 bombers and 700 fighters in the single largest attack launched on London thus-far. However, like so many of the battles before, Sunday, September 15, the day that would come to be known as Battle of Britain day, would not turn out the way the Goering had hoped. The raiders were attacked from the moment they appeared over the English coast, until they were well back over the channel heading for France. The R.A.F. lost twenty-six planes while the Luftwaffe lost fifty-six planes and at least twenty more ran out of fuel over the Channel and had to be abandoned by their pilots. On September 17, Hitler, after a series of delays, deiced to postpone Operation Sea Lion indefinitely, and turned his attention to the upcoming invasion of Russia. Hitler instructed his generals to bring about the subjugation of the British by other means. While the threat of invasion had been averted the people of London would soon learn that price for this respite was not cheap.
Between September 7 to November 2 not a single night went by with out the drone of German bombers and the stony sound of bombs landing in the streets of London. The Blitz, as this period would later be called, would be especially difficult on the civilian population of London. In October Goering had ordered the suspension of daylight bombing and had gone to strictly night bombings. This gave the German bombers much greater protection and a much higher survival rate. The British radar, which had proved so useful early on in the battle, was useless once the raiders passed the English coast. The bombers could fly so high that search-lights and flak could not reach them, and the British fighter-interceptors were almost useless at night. However, as effective as the German bombers were against London there was little, militarily, to be gained by the continual bombings. The people were staunch and patriotic enough to resist the psychological effects of the blitz, and the night raids proved to inaccurate to use against industry. After one final, devastating fire-bomb attack on London on May 10 that destroyed one and a half times the area that was engulfed in the Great Fire of 1666. The terror bombings of London were suspended all together, and the Battle of Britain was offically over.
The true importance of the Battle of Britain lies not in the military maneuvering, which like most battles are just lines on a map, but in the example it gave to the rest of the world. The British, alone and outnumbered, had managed to defeat the mightiest military machine in the world. A military that up till that point had not only been undefeated, but seemed to be invincible. This showed other countries like the United States, and Russia, now involved in their own war with Germany, that they had more options than capitulation or defeat at the hands of the Nazis. The Battle of Britain also showed that terror-bombings were ineffective against any populace that was mildly patriotic. Unfortunately most countries during World War II, including Britain in the bombing of Dresden, never seemed to learn this lesson. Ultimately the Battle of Britain showed many neutral countries that this was not a strictly European conflict, and that before it was all over most countries of the world would find it hard, if not impossible, to remain neutral. Churchill expressed it best when he said of the battle: ôThe British people held the fort ALONE till those who hitherto had been half blind were half ready.ö
Works Cited
Budiansky, Stephen, ôBritain: Defeating the Luftwaffe,ö in U.S. News & World Reports, August 27 (1990).
Churchill, Winston, The Second World War, Their Finest Hour, V. 2, Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1949.
